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Introduction: Brandom and Taylor on World Disclosure 
and the Exchange of Reasons
In a recent debate on language and rationality, Charles Taylor and Robert 
Brandom agree on many of the holistic assumptions of hermeneutics—what 
Brandom calls “Gadamerian platitudes”—but differ on the relationship of 
world disclosure to conceptual understanding and the exchanges of rea-
sons.1 Brandom insists that we “draw a bright line between conceptual 
understanding and other kinds of symbolic disclosedness.”2 In this view, 
“broadly symbolic [dimensions of language] in Cassirer’s sense, are not 
conceptual in the narrow propositional sense that I render in terms of 
inference and reasons.”3 He clarifies this by drawing on Wittgenstein’s 
well-known analogy of language as a city: “Language for [Wittgenstein] 
is all suburbs, merging imperceptibly into the surrounding and supporting 
countryside of nonlinguistic practices, and having no downtown. . . . I think 
1. Brandom uses the phrase to summarize some general assumptions that he wants 
to endorse: “the relativization of meaning to context in a very broad sense, the model 
of dialogue, meaning pluralism, the open-endedness and mutability of semantic perspec-
tives” (Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002], 
pp. 93–94). He adds: “But earning the entitlement to the commitments those platitudes 
express requires real work” (ibid., p. 94). Brandom differs in many important ways from 
Gadamer. See Cristina Lafont, “Meaning and Interpretation: Can Brandomian Scorekeep-
ers Be Gadamerian Hermeneuts?” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): 1–13.
2. Robert Brandom, “Reply to Taylor’s ‘Language Not Mysterious,’” Reading 
Brandom: On Making it Explicit, ed. Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), p. 303. “World Disclosure” is a translation of Heidegger’s various terms 
“Erschlossenheit,” “Lichtung,” and “Ereignis.”
3. Brandom, “Reply to Taylor’s ‘Language Not Mysterious,’” p. 302.
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language does have a downtown and that is the practice of giving and 
asking for reasons.”4 The practice of giving and asking for reasons swings 
free not only of symbolic uses but of particular forms of life.
Taylor, on the other hand, does not think we can isolate reason giv-
ing from disclosure in this way, “I remain convinced that the articulative 
[disclosive] cannot be peeled off from the public giving of and asking 
for reasons.”5 Any exchange over “the factual state of things” can only 
make sense if we set them “in the context of our ability to operate through 
the whole range of symbolic forms.”6 Hence, “there are certain mat-
ters which can’t be properly explored without recourse to the disclosive 
dimension. There couldn’t be an intelligent discussion of the beauty of 
landscape which didn’t either deploy or draw on our familiarity with, say, 
certain paintings. There couldn’t be a discussion of Christian piety which 
didn’t draw on, say, the music of Bach, or certain hymns, or Chartres 
Cathedral or an evocative life of Saint Francis.”7 For Taylor, there is a 
continuum between pure assertion—e.g., “Soup’s on!”—where something 
is asserted but nothing is disclosed, and pure disclosure—e.g., Chopin’s 
Fantaisie-Impromptu in C Sharp Minor, which “articulates a certain as 
yet indefinable longing. . . . A human possibility is articulated and disclosed 
here, but nothing is asserted.”8 Taylor gives artistic disclosure a privileged 
access to the distinctiveness of a form of life at the same time that he 
makes this disclosure ineffable.9
4. Brandom, “Reply to Taylor’s ‘Language Not Mysterious,’” p. 301. The reference 
here is to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2009), p. 11: “Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new house, and of houses with additions from various periods; and 
this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform 
houses.”
5. Charles Taylor, “Language Not Mysterious,” in Reading Brandom, p. 43.
6. Ibid., p. 34.
7. Ibid., p. 35.
8. Ibid.
9. Taylor follows the German hermeneutic tradition here. Gadamer also gives art 
privileged disclosive access to our being in the world in a way that exempts art from nor-
mative claims: “Prior to all conceptual scientific knowledge, the way in which we look 
upon the world, and upon our whole being-in-the-world, takes shape in art” (Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, “Philosophy and Poetry,” in The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. 
Robert Bernasconi [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986], p. 134). Gadamer opposes poetry 
and philosophy to everyday language: “Poetry and philosophy are both set off from the 
exchange of language as it takes place in practical activity and in science” (ibid., p. 133). 
Wolf Lepenies notes that “the antithesis of literature and poetry has been maintained in 
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Although Brandon and Taylor share a holistic critique of the Kan-
tian understanding of the concept, according to which the institution of 
conceptual norms is separate from their application, they develop differ-
ent kinds of holism.10 For Brandom, the key is Hegelian reconstruction: 
“[T]he rationality of the current decision, its justifiability as a correct 
application of a concept, is secured by rationally reconstructing the tra-
dition of its applications according to a certain model—by offering a 
selective, cumulative, expressively progressive genealogy of it. At each 
stage in its development, it is insofar as one takes the tradition to be ratio-
nal, by a Whiggish rewriting of its history, that one makes the tradition be 
and have been rational. . . . This is reason’s march through history. In this 
way, as Hegel puts it, contingency is given necessity.”11 In his book on 
Hegel, Taylor states his opposition to this reconstructive logic of transpar-
ent concepts, insisting that “the clarity of our most explicit conceptual 
formulations repose on a background of which we are not fully aware.”12 
Brandom concludes that Taylor is not a rationalist.13
While I agree with Taylor’s claim for the importance of world disclo-
sure, he makes a move that is all too typical of both defenders and critics 
of world disclosure by defining disclosure against everyday speech and 
normativity. In lumping together various aesthetic works and ignoring the 
disclosive power of everyday language, he fails to address the normative 
all its severity only in Germany, where it has been exacerbated through an asociality of 
poetical production in principle, that even sees its chief task as being the ‘refutation of the 
social’” (Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology [Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 1988], p. 12).
10. As Brandom says, Kant offers “a two-phase story, according to which one sort 
of activity institutes conceptual norms, and then another sort of activity applies those 
concepts. First, a reflective judgment (somehow) makes or finds the determinate rule that 
articulates [a] concept. Then, and only then, can that concept be applied in the determinate 
judgments and maxims that are the ultimate subject of the first two Critiques” (Robert B. 
Brandom, “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration 
in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms,” European Journal 
of Philosophy 7 (1999): 166. Brandom’s Hegel rejects this: “Our normative concepts are 
not instituted at the contractual level and then applied on the basis of the constitutive con-
tract. They are instituted in the process of mutual recognition in which individuals hold one 
another responsible and implicitly impute to others the authority to keep normative track 
of one another’s attitudes. This process does not need the social contract to get going or to 
get along” (ibid.).
11. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead, p. 14.
12. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), p. 467.
13. Brandom, “Reply to Taylor’s ‘Language Not Mysterious,’” p. 302.
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claims of disclosive writing that could answer disclosure’s critics.14 
Moreover, by giving poets and novelists blanket insight, he ignores the 
ways that literature can often be misleading, repulsive, or just stupid.15 
Disclosive writing does not just reveal existing backgrounds; it can make 
normative arguments for the revision of social imaginaries.
This essay will not try to defend the normative relevance of all forms 
of disclosure to public debate, but it will show the disclosive and norma-
tive power of everyday speech and the argumentative relevance of literary 
modes of writing. My purpose is to show, through selected examples, how 
the notion of world disclosure can improve our understanding of norma-
tivity and enrich the kinds of normative arguments that can be made.
My exposition falls into three parts. In the first section, I look at the 
transcendental arguments that subtend claims to world disclosure and dis-
tinguish prereflective from reflective disclosure. In the second, I develop 
the idea of prereflective disclosure and show how there can be productive 
debate at this level, drawing on Taylor’s conception of “social imaginaries” 
and on Talal Asad’s Foucauldian critique of Taylor. In the third section, I 
will discuss reflective disclosure as a discrete normative speech act, by look-
ing at the argumentative and disclosive power of ordinary prose in Susan 
Glaspell’s short story “A Jury of Her Peers.” It offers a way of understanding 
normative reasoning that is not present in Brandom or Taylor. Moreover, 
this work addresses the dynamics of disclosure and power, something that 
is missing from most defenders of disclosure.16 From this example, I will 
generalize about world disclosure, argument, and normativity.
14. Cristina Lafont says: “Our world disclosure seems unrevisable from within and 
inaccessible from without” (Cristina Lafont, “World-Disclosure and Critique: Did Haber-
mas Succeed in Thinking with Heidegger and against Heidegger?” Telos 145 [Winter 
2008]: 170). Habermas says: “To the degree that the poetic, world-disclosing function of 
language gains primacy and structuring force, language escapes the structural constraints 
and communicative functions of everyday life” (Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical Dis-
course of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press], p. 204). 
Kristin Gjesdal says that Gadamer espouses “an aestheticizing model of understanding” 
that “prevents him from developing an adequate notion of normative issues in herme-
neutics” (Kristin Gjesdal, Gadamer and the Legacy of German Idealism [Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2009], p. 3).
15. Thomas Dixon’s white supremacist novel The Clansmen, which served as the 
basis for D. W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation, would be an example of disclosive claims that 
are morally and politically repulsive.
16. This point has been raised against Gadamer, Taylor, and, most recently, Kom-
pridis. See Amy Allen, “The Power of Disclosure,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 
(2011): 1025–31.
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Prereflective and Reflective Disclosure
A key feature that differentiates Taylor, Gadamer, and Heidegger from 
Brandom is the notion of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) that Heidegger 
famously proposes in Being and Time. In this view, the subject should be 
understood as Dasein, thrown into the practices that can never be fully 
thematized and objectified.17 The worldhood into which we are thrown—
languages, social imaginaries, and practices—means that our thoughts, 
actions, and sentences do not spring from spontaneous, autonomous 
sources and for which we are entirely responsible. Utterances and actions 
depend on background that is logically prior to choice and reflection. In A 
Secular Age, Taylor writes: “We are in fact all acting, thinking and feeling 
out of backgrounds and frameworks which we do not fully understand. To 
ascribe total personal responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out of 
the human condition.”18 Brandom, on the other hand, addresses the ques-
tion of background by denying any idea of “thrownness.” Background, for 
him, is a matter of choosing a context rather than something that makes 
choice possible: “The conceptual content of a claim can in principle be 
specified only against the background of some such set of commitments. 
The interpreter has considerable choice in selecting such a context or infer-
ential perspective. But once such a point of view has been selected . . . then 
it is not at all up to the ascriber what the significance of the claims in ques-
tion is in the chosen context. The context is, if you like, made; but then the 
inferential significance of a text in the context is found.”19
Because of their different understandings of our being in language, 
Brandom and Taylor have different views about how reasoning takes place. 
For Taylor, the task of reason is not achieved by parsing entailments and 
inferences but by seeking “to articulate a framework . . . , to try to spell out 
what is it that we presuppose when we make a judgment that a certain form 
17. Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Alfred Hofstadter 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1982), p. 297.
18. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007), p. 387. He 
makes the same point in Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989). We do 
not choose to commit to evaluative frameworks; rather, evaluative frameworks are logi-
cally prior to choice and reflection: “The point of view from which we might constate that 
all orders are equally arbitrary, in particular that moral views are equally so, is just not 
available to us humans. It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a 
moral orientation which we take to be right. That’s a condition of being a functioning self, 
not a metaphysical view we can put on or off” (p. 99).
19. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead, p. 105.
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of life is truly worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement.”20 
These are the conditions of intentionality, and they are precisely “the back-
ground understanding surrounding any conviction that we ought not act in 
this or that way that procedural theory cannot articulate.”21
We can get a grasp of what Taylor is after here by drawing on Niko-
las Kompridis’s distinction between prereflective and reflective world 
disclosure. Prereflective disclosure “refers to the disclosure of an already 
interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is, within which 
we always already find ourselves.”22 Reflective disclosure—and here I 
modify Kompridis’s definition—is the intervention in the prereflective 
practices and structures of meaning by an utterance, work of art, etc. The 
agency of individual imagination expresses itself through and against the 
social imaginaries in which it finds itself.
 Reflective disclosure reworks the languages and structures used to 
make sense of ourselves and the world, and these interventions can take 
the form of normative arguments, as we will see. Individual texts do not 
simply reveal what cannot be said in ordinary language about the current 
world, nor are they synecdoches for an era. There are many ways that texts 
make normative arguments.
Prereflective disclosure is the articulation of our passive relationship 
to structures of intelligibility, and Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries 
illustrates this idea well. Here he discusses the public sphere, popular sov-
ereignty, and other shared deep structuring features of Western modernity, 
and he does so without references to singular works of art, as he did in 
the Brandom debate, where reflective disclosure was at issue. Here the 
20. Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 26.
21. Ibid., p. 87; Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1997), pp. 14–15.
22. Nikolas Kompridis makes this important distinction: “World disclosure refers, 
with deliberate ambiguity, to a process which actually occurs at two different levels. At one 
level, it refers to the disclosure of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the 
world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves. At another level, it refers as 
much to the disclosure of new horizons of meaning as to the disclosure of previously hid-
den or unthematized dimensions of meaning” (Nikolas Kompridis, “On World Disclosure, 
Heidegger, Habermas, and Dewey,” Thesis Eleven [1994]: 37). Kompridis sensitive work 
rightly defends the cognitive status of world disclosure; however, he too separates norma-
tive argument from literary genres: “What does distinguish the world-disclosing activity 
of philosophy from that of literature is that it takes place in, is made possible by a different 
medium—the medium of argument, rather than the medium of fiction or appearance. In 
each case, the medium is distinctive of that practice” (Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and 
Disclosure [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006], p. 179).
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language of articulation is a socio-historical language of social imaginar-
ies. For Taylor, giving genealogies of these background structures that we 
take for granted is relevant to the arguments of practical reason.
It is important to note that what Taylor is calling “background” is the 
onto-historical dimension of a community that has been developed in dif-
ferent ways by many thinkers who are dissatisfied with the narrow focus 
on normative reason giving that occupies liberal and deliberative theories. 
They often use the opposition “the political and politics,” in which “the 
political” designates an onto-historical space that is occluded by liberal-
ism. Claude Lefort’s articulation has been perhaps the most influential, 
for he says that investigating the political means examining how the form 
of society gives the facts of political science “a meaning in the social 
space . . . as a space of intelligibility articulated in accordance with a spe-
cific mode of distinguishing between the real and the imaginary, the true 
and the false.”23 The political helps thematize what is blocked out by a 
political science that focuses only on factual elements of society and by 
a philosophy of language that begins by separating reason giving from 
forms of life.24
Social Imaginaries and the Negotiation of Disciplines
In Modern Social Imaginaries and A Secular Age, Taylor uses the term 
“social imaginaries” to talk about the ontological background of Western 
modernity, citing as his immediate source Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities. Anderson’s work explains the transition from dynastic 
regimes to modern nations, not by focusing on the self-conscious political 
ideologies of the eighteenth century and their ways of understanding the 
nation—e.g., social contract theories for the derivation of norms—but by 
drawing on the problematic of social imaginaries in order to reconstruct 
23. Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey (Minneapo-
lis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 11.
24. For a recent treatment of Lefort and literature, see Martin Plot, “Tlön as Political 
Form: Democracy and Totalitarianism in Borges and Lefort,” Constellations 19 (2012): 
463–79. Chantal Mouffe says that “politics refers to the ‘ontic’ level while ‘the political’ 
has to do with the ‘ontological’ one. This means that the ontic has to do with the manifold 
practices of conventional politics, while the ontological concerns the very way in which 
society is” (Chantal Mouffe, The Political [New York: Routledge, 2005], p. 8). Marcel 
Gauchet, for instance, says that the political is a way of discussing “the totality of human 
societies,” while “politics” is simply “the face that the political takes on in our society” 
(Marcel Gauchet, La Condition politique [Paris: Gallimard, 2005], p. 532). I will look at 
Talal Asad’s critique at this level in a moment.
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the organizing identities and cultural systems of medieval life, the dynasty/
kingdom, and the sacred text. It was through and against these that modern 
nationalism emerged.25 Anderson’s approach to the history of culture is to 
speak of “imagined communities”—that is, communities held together not 
by mere spatial connection, such as a village, but by common forms and 
styles of imagination for understanding identity, time, etc., forms that were 
shaped by new media of the eighteenth century, the modern novel, and 
the newspaper. The effect of objectification of time in literature, Anderson 
argues, is to make it normal for us to envisage unconnected events as occur-
ring simultaneously in the same story space. The reader is made into an 
omniscient observer, able to hold these independently unfolding trains of 
events together. Author and reader are like God watching them in a common 
space, an organizing form of consciousness that brings people together.26
However, Taylor cannot appropriate Anderson’s work directly, for its 
third-person sociological approach to texts is external, offering explana-
tory structures, not a phenomenological laying out of the imaginaries into 
which participants are “thrown” and through which they think and act.27 
Hence, Taylor develops the social imaginary as a kind of background in 
the Heideggerian sense so that it is brought into a problematic of Dasein’s 
“thrownness”: “The social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather, it is what 
enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society. . . . [Thus,] the 
notion of moral order goes beyond some proposed schedule of norms that 
ought to govern our mutual relations and/or political life. . . . The image 
of order carries a definition not only of what is right, but of the context 
in which it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right.”28 The 
development of such an understanding of moral means “is the coming to 
be of certain social forms,” forms that the problematic of the imaginary 
can articulate.29 What Taylor wants from sociologists such as Anderson, 
25. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 12. Taylor cites Anderson in Modern 
Social Imaginaries and A Secular Age.
26. Taylor’s interest in the novel is shaped by Anderson’s and Ian Watt’s formalist 
approaches. All Taylor wants from the novel is the new shape of time and the elevation of 
ordinary life, not new ways of thinking.
27. Taylor never articulates his differences from Anderson, Heidegger, or Gadamer. 
He simply imports their ideas and develops them in his own way.
28. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2004), 
pp. 2, 8–9.
29. Ibid., p. 2. Imaginaries are the middle level of articulation, between the “explicit 
doctrines about society, the divine or the cosmos.” The second is “the symbolic,” which 
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and from historians such as François Furet and Edmund Morgan, is a 
language that can articulate how societies were reshaped and how they 
thematized this reshaping through time.30 This fine-grained analysis, such 
as Morgan’s on popular sovereignty, is missing from hermeneutic char-
acterizations, such as Gadamer’s tradition, which largely ignore modern 
political institutions.
Social imaginaries work in an analogous way to Heidegger’s distinc-
tion between ontological and ontic interpretation. The ontic interpretation 
looks at whether an issue within the world of a particular culture: for 
example, whether forbidding the wearing of headscarves by flight atten-
dants violates the First Amendment in the United States or the doctrine 
of laïcité in France. Ontological interpretation, on the other hand, inves-
tigates how things show up at all—in this case, whether the very idea of 
secularity is present.
We can see the relationship of the ontological background (the politi-
cal) to politics in Taylor’s work by looking quickly at A Secular Age. At 
the beginning of A Secular Age, he distinguishes three kinds of secularism. 
The concerns of philosophers of public reason are placed in “Secularity 1,” 
which focuses on the retreat of religion from the common institutions and 
practices, “most obviously, but not only, the state.”31 This is the normative, 
political secularism of public reason that addresses such controversies as 
the wearing of headscarves to school or the display of religious symbols 
on state grounds.32 A second sense of secularity refers to the decline of 
religious belief and practice—people no longer going to church, syna-
gogue, or mosque, for instance. This sociological approach is often called 
“secularization.”33 The third and most important sense of secularity for 
is found in art and ritual and close to what historians call “mentalités,” and the third is 
“embodied understanding,” or “habitus” (Charles Taylor, “Two Theories of Modernity,” 
Public Culture 11 [1999]: 167).
30. Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in 
England and America (New York: Norton, 1989); François Furet, Penser la révolution 
française (Paris: Gallimard, 1978).
31. Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 1.
32. The French idea of “laïcité” is a set of principles and practices that establish the 
relationship of religion and the state. See Catherine Kintzler, Qu’est-ce que la laïcité? 
(Paris: Vrin, 2007). For the American debates, see Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Con-
stitution, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009).
33. For a concise treatment of some of the issues in comparative secularization, see 
José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,” The 
Hedgehog Review (Spring/Summer 2006): 7–22. Subtraction stories can also work by 
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Taylor concerns the shift in “the conditions of belief,” since this sense 
gives a place to the ontological history he finds important. On this view, 
the “shift to secularity consists of a move from a society where belief in 
God is unchallenged and unproblematic to one in which it is understood to 
be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.”34 
In other words, Taylor wants to examine the shift “which takes us from a 
society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one 
in which faith, even for the staunchest believers, is one possibility among 
others.”35
Taylor’s claim for Secularity 3 is not simply that this is a better 
description of contemporary society’s understanding of religion and secu-
larity. His claim is philosophical. Although we may have much to learn 
from researchers in Secularity 1 and 2, they have left out the worldhood of 
the world. Sociologists may focus on gathering statistics about church or 
synagogue attendance as evidence of secularization, while political philos-
ophers may assert the uncontroversial “fact of pluralism” in order to focus 
on the construction of norms of mutual accommodation.36 But before these 
facts or norms can make sense, they require a background that lets them 
appear for us as phenomena. Of course, people can bring different ideas 
and attitudes to a secularity, but “what they do not bring into the negotia-
tions is the set of ideas and norms constitutive of [secularity itself]. These 
must be the common property of society before there can be any ques-
tion of [debate]. Hence, they are not subjective meanings, the property 
of one or some individual, but rather intersubjective meanings, which are 
constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and 
act.”37 Hence, Taylor’s question is: what are the background assumptions, 
speaking of modernity’s differentiation—e.g., the economy moves from the household to 
its own sphere or “health care” moves from the church to other institutions—but are miss-
ing the complex ways societies is changing.
34. Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 3.
35. Ibid.
36. John Rawls says, “Political liberalism that, for political purposes, a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise 
of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of the constitutional regime” 
(John Rawls, Political Liberalism [New York: Columbia UP, 1993], p. xvi). Moreover, 
Rawls claims, history has already shown that this is possible, “History tells of a plurality of 
not unreasonable comprehensive doctrines” (ibid., p. 140).
37. Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985), 
p. 36. I have substituted “secularity” for the “negotiation” in this well-known passage from 
Taylor’s work since he is making the same point with secularity.
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practices, languages, etc., that make the contemporary experience of the 
secular and the religious possible, for believers, agnostics, and atheists? 
We stand in a normed world of social imaginaries that cannot be set aside 
to get clear about particular normative concepts.
Taylor does a genealogy of Western secularity that gives a new 
account of how our current background assumptions emerged, drawing 
out new historical richness and complexity that becomes available and 
normatively relevant through this problematic. We cannot just toss in a 
vague, schematic historical tale about how secularity emerged from the 
wars of religion and modern science in order to focus on the principles of 
public reason.38 Rather, “our sense of where we are is crucially defined in 
part by a story of how we got there. . . . And just because we describe where 
we are in relating a journey, we can misdescribe it grievously by misiden-
tifying the itinerary. That is what the subtraction accounts of modernity 
have in fact done. To get straight where we are, we have to go back and 
tell the story properly.”39 To get oriented to the world and our place in it 
requires more than abstract principles, such as “the separation of church 
and state,” for they block out the massive background that shapes reason-
ing. Normativity cannot swing free from contestable historical accounts of 
how our self-understandings came about because it is woven from specific 
social imaginaries.
Taylor’s articulations interrogate this space, seeking “to transfer what 
has sunk to the level of an organizing principle for present practices and 
hence beyond examination into a view for which there can be reasons 
either for or against.”40 In this way, Taylor wants to begin reasoning by 
38. Rawls gives his famous capsule summary of the background to liberalism in 
the introduction to Political Liberalism: “Thus the historical of origin of political liber-
alism . . . is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious 
toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
p. xxiv). See Jan-Werner Muller, “Rawls, Historian: Remarks on Political Liberalism’s 
‘Historicism,’” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 60 (2006): 327–39.
39. Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 29.
40. Charles Taylor, “Philosophy and Its History,” in Philosophy in History, ed. Rich-
ard Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), p. 28. Taylor is not always clear about 
the relationship of philosophical concepts to imaginaries. When he speaks of the “modern 
moral order,” for instance, he suggests that the moral order is first a theory that trickles 
into imaginaries: “In the course of expansion, it [moral order] moved from being a theory, 
animating the discourse of a few experts, to becoming integral to our social imaginary, 
that is, the way our contemporaries imagine the societies they inhabit and sustain” (Taylor, 
Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 4). Here he suggests that the imaginaries can be the point 
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reopening the assumptions of modernity and displaying the complex, con-
flicted historical inheritance that lies behind current usage. This means 
learning to think historically about how we came to be who we are today 
by “undo[ing] forgetting.”41
Taylor’s account moves between third-person narration from a neo-
Durkheimian angle that looks at large-scale shifts in the structure of 
imaginaries to first-person renderings of the participants’ own language, 
what he calls particular “spins” on this background. The external account 
of meaning and social practices alternates with a phenomenology of dif-
ferent kinds of belief and nonbelief, showing different takes on what it 
feels like to live in a secular age: “I want to talk about belief and unbelief, 
not as rival theories, that is, ways that people account for existence or 
morality, whether by God or by something in nature, or whatever. Rather, 
what I want to do is focus attention on the different kinds of lived experi-
ence involved in understanding your life in one way or the other, on what 
it’s like to live as a believer or unbeliever.”42
The purpose of Taylor’s articulations is not simply to improve our 
understanding of the past but to enrich our normative debates of the present 
by broadening the space of argument. By providing a genealogy of West-
ern secularity as complex knot of historical processes peculiar to Western 
Christianity, rather than a principle that needs to be applied, Taylor makes 
any use of this concept more contextually dependent and vulnerable than 
the reductive constructions of normative philosophy and sociology. The 
widespread interdisciplinary debate over his work is a testament not just to 
the quality of the work but to the enriched landscape of normative reason-
ing that his work solicits. Taylor gives us more to argue with and about.43
Critique of Taylor’s Ontological History
It has been a standard criticism of Taylor’s Sources of the Self and A Secular 
Age that these ontological histories ignore conflict, otherness, oppression, 
of initiation for philosophical concepts. My focus is on the imaginary as a place where 
argument can take place.
41. Taylor, “Philosophy and Its History,” p. 21.
42. Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 4–5.
43. Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 29. Taylor himself is not entirely clear on how he under-
stands the normative and deliberative importance of Secularity 3—i.e., the consequences 
for Secularity 1 of bringing Secularity 3 into the process. See his recent work on Secular-
ity 2, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, with Jocelyn Maclure (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 2011). I discuss some of these issues in “Secularism and Public Reason.”
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and colonialism.44 I will discuss briefly Talal Asad’s critique of Taylor’s 
work because he makes it at the ontological, prereflective level in his For-
mations of the Secular, showing how background becomes an important 
site for debate. I will then move to my critique of his understanding of nar-
rative and imaginaries in reflective disclosure. I will bring the two points 
together with my example in the next section.
Asad announces at the beginning of his work that he will distinguish 
the historico-ontological enterprise of studying secularity from the nar-
rowly focused debates on principle and policy: “It is a major premise of 
this study that ‘the secular’ is conceptually prior to the political doctrine 
of ‘secularism,’ that over time a variety of concepts, practices and sensi-
bilities have come together to form ‘the secular.’ In chapters that follow 
I begin with a partial genealogy of that concept, an effort aimed at ques-
tioning its self-evident character while assuring at the same time that it 
nevertheless marks something real. . . . Genealogy is not intended here as a 
substitute for social history (‘real history’ as many would put it) but as a 
way of working back from our present to the contingencies that have come 
together to give us our certainties.”45 If he is like Taylor in his concern with 
modernity’s misdescriptions of itself through time, he is less focused on 
the articulation of the conditions of possibility than he is on the power of 
these misdescriptions to shape the world. Asad makes a disclosive coun-
terargument: “The important question is therefore not to determine why 
44. See Saba Mahmood, “Can Secularism Be Otherwise?” Varieties of Secularism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010); and Peter van der Veer, “Smash Temples, Burn 
Books: Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China,” in Rethinking Secularism, ed. 
Craig Calhoun et al. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011). In his reply to Quentin Skinner’s criticism 
that he avoids political conflicts over women’s roles in the family in Sources of the Self, 
Taylor says: “In speaking of family, what I am attributing to ‘us’ is rather a whole lineage. 
The point is not to overlook battles over sexual reactions but to point out how much both 
sides actually share” (Charles Taylor, “Comments and Replies,” Inquiry 34 [1991]: 238). 
This reply shows the way Taylor’s ontological approach to background can elide crucial 
shifts in the imaginary.
45. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003), 
p. 16. Asad insists on large-scale genealogical disclosure: “What is distinctive in modern 
anthropology is the comparison of embedded concepts (representations) between societies 
differently located in time or space. The important thing in this comparative analysis is not 
their origin (Western or non-Western), but the forms of life that articulate them, the powers 
they release or disable. Secularism—like religion—is such a concept” (ibid., p. 17). Asad 
directs his critique at Taylor’s “Modes of Secularism,” in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. 
Rajeev Bhargava (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), which is oriented toward Secularism 1, state 
policy, in which Taylor advocates a version of Rawls’s “overlapping consensus.”
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the idea of ‘modernity’ (or ‘the West’) is a misdescription, but why it has 
become hegemonic as a political goal, what practical consequences fol-
low from that hegemony, and what social conditions maintain it.”46 Asad 
shows how secularism continues its Christian origins, working itself into 
a grammar of modernity, including human rights (see chapter 4 of Forma-
tions of the Secular).47
He explores exactly what Taylor’s Heideggerian holism ignores: 
the relationship of secularism to domination. While Taylor thinks of the 
ontological as the unrecognized condition of possibility, Asad looks at the 
way this ontological sharing is a forced imposition on different positions. 
“Secularism,” for Asad, “is not simply an intellectual answer to a question 
about enduring social peace and toleration. It is an enactment by which a 
political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends 
particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated though 
class, gender, and religion.”48 Asad’s comparative critique puts pressure on 
Taylor’s account not just to acknowledge aspects of the history that it has 
denied or left out; rather, Asad is disclosing a deep ontological layering 
of the social imaginaries and of concepts that go unnoticed by Taylor’s 
construal of ontological history. Answering Asad’s critique would require 
the inclusion of ignored encounters with others as well as a revision of 
Taylor’s description of the structures of the imaginaries and the concepts 
of normativity that are bound up with them. In order to understand what a 
revision would look like, we need to examine Taylor’s conception of nar-
rative and see how it keeps him from examining the arguments of stories.
Reflective Disclosure or Reasoning through the Social Imaginary
Social imaginaries, as Taylor describes them, provide the space for a new 
conception of disclosure and practical reasoning, but, as we have seen, he 
does not follow through on how reflective disclosure can argue. Taylor 
gives a large place to narrative, especially in A Secular Age, but he never 
speaks of narratives, fictional or nonfictional, as forms of reflection by 
individuals and groups in political arguments over the shapes of modern 
46. Asad, Formations of the Secular, p. 13, emphasis in original. Asad’s project is to 
examine “changes in the grammar of concepts” (ibid., p. 25). Asad, like Taylor, draws on 
the notion of “habitus” to talk about embodied capacities (ibid., p. 95).
47. In “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” in Gene-
alogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993), Asad examines how Clifford 
Geertz’s notion of religion as a universal category embeds Christian assumptions within it.
48. Asad, Formations of the Secular, p. 5.
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imaginaries. When he speaks of literary or historical texts, he takes a for-
malist view of the novel and narrative borrowed from Anderson and Ian 
Watt or drops a casual footnote to MacIntyre or Ricoeur, while ignoring 
the dynamic struggle of imaginaries.
In his debate with Brandom, he moves from the nondisclosive “Soup’s 
on!” to the untranslatable notes of Chopin, ignoring some obvious examples 
of disclosive argument in literature’s engagement with social imaginar-
ies. In Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, the text offers a dramatic 
critique of realism and its assumptions through its mode of presentation—
e.g., parody of the Goncourt brothers—and through its philosophical 
statements In La Nausée, Sartre argues with Proustian assumptions about 
time, language, and the phenomenology of experience through its narra-
tive technique as much as through its propositions.49 These texts focus 
on the structures of intelligibility both in and outside literary practice. 
However, such arguments are also present in works that do not make 
explicit philosophical statements. Jonathan Swift argues with the scien-
tific, literary, and political culture of his day in Gulliver’s Travels through 
satire, parody, exaggeration, and other means. Henry James, who avoids 
commentary on his narratives, implicitly attacks, through his depiction of 
consciousness, normativity, and language, the understanding of language, 
mind, and normativity presented by Flaubert’s texts.50 To address this topic 
fully, I would have to work through a theory of the novel and its challenge 
to understandings of the aesthetic, which would pull my essay off the topic 
of normativity. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, who emphasizes the need for a prosaics instead of a poetics to 
address the distinctively modern genre, the novel. Criticizing traditional 
poetics for its focus on the formal or stylistic unity of a work, Bakhtin 
understands the novel as engaging and orchestrating all the languages 
49. In his essay on The Sound and Fury, Sartre says, “A novelistic technique always 
refers back to the metaphysics of the novelist” (Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations [Paris: Gal-
limard, 1947], 1:71). Taylor’s inattention to disclosive narrative arguments also keeps him 
from exploring spiritual options, as several commentators have noted. Peter E. Gordon 
says, “What I am trying to suggest is that Taylor’s textured history of background should 
have awakened him to the (possibly distressing) thought that there are many modes of the 
sacred and many kinds of wonder and that the Christian religion is merely one historical 
deposit” (Peter E. Gordon, “The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 69 [2008]: 672).
50. On James, see my essay “The Philosophical Importance of Henry James’s Late 
Style,” The Henry James Review 35 (2014): 209–17, where I contrast my conception of 
normativity in James with those of Martha Nussbaum and Robert Pippin.
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of the imaginary—literary, political, sociological, philosophical, etc.51 
Bakhtin provides modes of thematizing, interrogating, and revising the 
languages of the modern social imaginaries in ways that are missing from 
philosophies of world disclosure and social science.52 This does not mean 
that literary or other disclosive works are necessarily perspicuous or that 
they make good arguments. My point is to talk about disclosure in terms 
of prose writing, in and outside literature, so as to enrich the ways that 
disclosive language can contribute to practical deliberation. What follows 
is a focused philosophical example of the kind of argument I mean.
Susan Glaspell’s short story “A Jury of Her Peers” offers a phenome-
nology of interpretation in a straightforward everyday language that opens 
the boundaries of art and everyday speech and shows how narratives can 
make normative arguments.53 The tale begins when Mrs. Hale is called 
from her work in the kitchen to join her husband, Mr. Peters (the sheriff), 
and his wife. Mrs. Hale, the center of focalization for the third-person 
narrative, learns that Mr. Wright, the husband of an old friend, has been 
killed. The sheriff suspects Mrs. Hale’s friend Minnie has killed her hus-
band. The group proceeds to the Wrights’ home, where it splits up. The 
men go out to the barn to look for evidence that can establish a motive 
for Minnie, while the women wait in the kitchen. While sitting there, they 
encounter the “text” of Minnie’s life—the dirty towels, the mishandled 
stitching on her quilt, the act of violence of which she is suspected, and 
so on. That is, the dominant tradition that the women bring to Minnie’s 
house, a tradition that they share with their husbands, forms preunder-
standings that do not help them reconstitute the self-understanding of the 
text. The men have called Minnie “mad,” and the women at this point can 
articulate no other reading, even though they sense that more is at stake 
here for them.
51. See Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981). Bakhtin’s philosophy of language 
and the novel is far too rich and complex for me to develop here.
52. Bakhtin asks us to see that “what is realized in the novel is the process of com-
ing to know one’s own language as it is perceived in someone else’s language, coming 
to known one’s own conceptual horizon in someone else’s conceptual horizon (Bakhtin, 
Dialogic Imagination, p. 365). The novel is not concerned with capturing the speech of an 
era but with what he calls “the image of language,” which “reveals not only the reality of a 
given language but also, as it were its potential, its ideal limits” (ibid., p. 356).
53. Susan Glaspell, “A Jury of Her Peers,” in Best Short Stories of 1917 (Boston: 
Small, Maynard, 1918).
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Slowly the women start to put together an explanation of the strange-
ness of Minnie’s text—the systematic psychological torture to which her 
husband subjected her, a torture that culminated in the strangulation of 
Minnie’s double, her pet bird. The process of coming to this explanation 
forces them to transform the understandings of their own lives and indeed 
the gendered imaginaries of the time. Minnie’s text asks them disturbing 
questions, not just the other way around. To understand this text means 
that they can no longer remain who they are. They discover that Minnie’s 
husband was not just “a cruel man” but also a typical one and that Min-
nie’s response differs only in degree, not in kind, from the ones they have 
felt but repressed. It is important that Mr. Wright commits no actionable 
offense. He merely brings into relief the norms that are already there and 
that inform the actions within many marriages. The story’s off-stage nar-
rator shows their complex interaction with the text—sometimes it grabs 
them and sometimes they push it away—that is rarely made explicit in 
their consciousness or in dialogue. The women are not exchanging claims 
in discursive dialogue in which they use the constructed political concepts 
to unmask ideology.54 They are experiencing a rupture in the very medium 
that constitutes them—i.e., Glaspell is arguing through the imaginary in 
displaying this rupture. The context of their reading—their moments of 
isolation interrupted by their husbands’ condescending remarks about the 
triviality of women’s occupations—helps foster their transformative read-
ing. The women come to understand that the values and textures of their 
own lives are neither read nor recognized by their husbands and that the 
forces that drove Minnie mad operate around and within them as well. The 
women discover the narrow social space in which they have been chan-
neled to live and the anger that they have been socialized to ignore. They 
begin to understand that, in Catherine MacKinnon’s words, “dominant 
narratives are not called stories. They called are reality.”55
Ambivalent about this knowledge that their reading is bringing about, 
they alternately leap at it and hide from it. The boundaries of their selves 
54. Edward Said’s Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993) and Seyla Ben-
habib’s The Claims of Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2002) exemplify this way of 
thinking about normativity. They objectify and unmask the languages of texts as unreliable 
ethical or political guides, while drawing their normative authority from a neo-Kantian 
universalism that can be separated from its damaged historical instantiations.
55. Catherine MacKinnon, “Law’s Stories as Reality and Politics,” in Law’s Stories: 
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven, CT: 
Yale UP, 1996), p. 235.
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have been unraveled as Minnie’s text speaks not only to them but for them: 
“It was as if something within her not herself had spoken, and it found in 
Mrs. Peters something that she did not know as herself.”56 Interpretation in 
this story is dramatized as an event, not an act. When Mrs. Peters discovers 
the strangled bird, she does not just solve a detective’s riddle; she reworks 
the fabric of her memory and identity. As she recalls and revises the story 
of what a boy with a hatchet had done to her cat many years ago, she gets 
back the rage of the past moment: “‘If they hadn’t held me back, I would 
have . . .’” Minnie’s text forces them to see themselves and their husbands 
in a way that requires a new language that gives distinctiveness and worth 
to lives and that goes unread by the dominant culture. The women do not 
“empathize” with Minnie by learning the particulars of her life. Nor do 
they learn to apply a principle of nondomination or antidiscrimination. 
Instead, Minnie’s text forces them to change who they are and how they 
understand their lives and marriages.57
Unlike Minnie, they are able to create a way of speaking that unites 
them with each other and separates them from the men. They have formed 
a powerful normative language that gives them reasons to do something 
they never could have imagined before they arrived at the Wrights’ house. 
They have created a “new space of reasons,” to use Wilfrid Sellars’s 
famous phrase.58
Their interpretations open a new, hitherto unthinkable space of action: 
they choose to hide the bird (conceal evidence), betray their husbands, 
and break the law. There is nothing ineffable about this disclosure, but 
the reasons of the argument do not appear in terms of the principles of 
public reason, such justice and equality. Certainly, such notions inform the 
56. Glaspell, “A Jury of Her Peers,” p. 272.
57. I am thus opposed to Nussbaum’s conception of literature as providing access 
to an alternative life, a subject to subject conception in which literary texts offer a kind 
of specificity and emotional richness missing from both universalizing normative theory 
and the social sciences. Hence, it is not surprising that she does not see her view as incom-
patible with that of sensitive Kantians: “My own preferred version of the ethical stance 
derives from Aristotle, but everything I say here could be accommodated by a Kantianism 
modified so as to give the emotions a carefully demarcated cognitive role” (Martha Nuss-
baum, Poetic Justice [Boston: Beacon Press, 1995], p. xvi). Normativity is located safely 
in principles and the argumentative work through the imaginary is ignored.
58. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997), 
Sellars writes that “in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not 
giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical 
space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (76).
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background, but these notions are woven into the textures of their shared 
imaginaries, and their revisions of their existing understandings occur at 
the level of the imaginary rather than explicit naming. The third-person 
narrator articulates the new space of understanding that emerges for them 
without ever reducing it to a conceptual label. This understanding of pub-
lic reason shows how the languages of the social imaginary of identity are 
bound up with normativity. These “identities” are large-scale formations 
that involve the articulation of individualism, gender, autonomy, the public 
sphere, etc., as well as fine-grained distinctions that shape this particular 
American social space at this particular time.
Thus, in answer to Brandom’s charge—and those of other critics of 
world disclosure—that world disclosure does not offer reasons and to 
Taylor’s failure to connect disclosure to normativity, I would say that this 
story is Susan Glaspell’s disclosive, argumentative reasoning.59 It offers a 
complex account of the discovery of violence embedded in one configura-
tion of norms and meanings, of one configuration of reason giving. Rather 
than understanding reasoning as the application of the same principles, we 
must take up the complex claims about the normativity of shared imaginar-
ies. How does one go from not seeing domination to seeing it? Not through 
the application of a constructed principle, but by normative articulations 
that open up new ways of being in the world. Instead of reasoning by 
constructing a normative principle on which citizens “ought” to agree and 
then applying it, we reason by tacking between accounts of our ontological 
background and the interpretive normative intervention that we make.60 
59. This conception of narrative is directly at odds with Ricoeur’s, which keeps nov-
elists out of the argument business, limiting them only to emplotment. “Historians are 
not simply narrators: they give reasons. . . . Poets also create plots that are held together 
by causal skeletons. But these . . . are not the subject of a process of argumentation. Poets 
restrict themselves to producing the story and explaining by narrating. . . . [Poets] produce, 
[historians] argue” (Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blaney [Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984], 1:186. By looking at narrative as the formal emplotment 
of the heterogeneous, Ricoeur blocks out the way in which emplotment is always a reem-
ployment of the narrative and symbolic shapes that the subject inevitably inhabits. I have 
developed this critique in Hiding from History: Politics and Public Imagination (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell UP, 2005), pp. 48–54.
60. It is important to distinguish this conclusion from what is often called the “prag-
matist solution,” in which all we have are applications of norms. As Frank Michelman puts 
it, “Pragmatism thus attacks our grip on the idea of the priority of norms to decisions—
on the idea, that is, that prior agreement on the contents of the applicable norms is what 
grounds or determines whatever agreements we may find we have about the resolutions 
of particular social disputes. . . . Pragmatism leaves it unclear what the normal norms—the 
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In my view, what is prior to the decision is not the content of a principle 
derived from a constructivist idealization, but instead the historico-onto-
logical background and the significant interventions that have been made 
or blocked out. That is why debate always has to be about what is subtend-
ing our self-understandings and not just what is in front of us.
Glaspell’s text is not an isolated example of such reasoning. Ralph 
Ellison’s fictional and nonfictional works argue with America’s racial 
imaginaries by holding up racial structuring for the reader and then work-
ing through these structures.61 Understanding social imaginaries as the 
space of argument is not limited to literature, of course, and we find many 
examples in political philosophy and the real world, from the Arab Spring 
to contemporary photography.62 Once normativity is understood through 
the imaginaries, the shape of normative argument must be flexible enough 
to acknowledge and address the claims that reflective disclosures make 
about the background that has shaped us and the normative future that 
remains to be articulated.
nominal principles of justice for example—can possibly ever be or have been but traces 
of their applications to date and reflections.” Frank Michelman “The Problem of Constitu-
tional Interpretive Disagreement,” in Habermas and Pragmatism, ed. Mitchell Aboulafia 
et al. [New York: Routledge, 2002], p. 114.
61. Ellison understood novels as arguments: “All novels of a given historical moment 
form an argument over the nature of reality and are, to an extent, criticisms of each other” 
(Ralph Ellison, Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison [New York: Modern Library, 1995], 
p. 165). I develop this reading of Ellison in “The Social Imaginary as a Problematic for 
Human Rights,” in Theoretical Perspectives on Human Rights and Literature (New York: 
Routledge, 2011).
62. See, for instance, Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, eds., The Politics of Imagi-
nation (New York: Birkbeck Law Press, 2011), which includes an essay by Challand on 
imaginaries and imagination in Islamism and by Susan Buck-Morss on photography.
